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Prudential Regulation and Supervision Instruments and Aims: A General Framework

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Author Info
Claire Giordano () (Bank of Italy, Structural Studies Department)

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Abstract

The aim of the present note is to outline a general, but at the same time comprehensive, framework of the array of instruments that regulators can use in their activity of prudential regulation and supervision. Such a framework should be applicable to a variety of geographical and historical contexts and should aid cross-country and temporal comparisons concerning regulation activity. It is an extension and a reorganization of White's (2009) categorization, which in turn is built on Mishkin's (2001) work. The novelty of the resulting framework is a clear distinction between the tools, the aims and the institutional setting of prudential regulation.

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Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department in its series Conference Papers with number giordano.

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Date of creation: Jan 2009
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Handle: RePEc:bdi:confpa:giordano

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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  1. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2000. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999," NBER Working Papers 7715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues?," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 1-30 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2004. "Competition and financial stability," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 453-486.
    Other versions:
  4. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 233-272 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Government Ownership of Banks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 265-301, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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