Delegated Portfolio Management and Risk Taking Behavior
AbstractStandard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives; however empirical studies on mutual funds present mixed results. In this paper, we propose a behavioral principal-agent model in the context of professional managers, focusing on active and passive investment strategies. Using this general framework, we evaluate how incentives affect the risk taking behavior of managers, using the standard moral hazard model as a special case; and solve the previous contradiction. Empirical evidence, based on a comprehensive world sample of 4584 mutual funds, gives support to our theoretical model.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department in its series Working Papers Series with number 199.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?english
Other versions of this item:
- Jose Luiz Barros Fernandes & Juan Ignacio Pena & Benjamin Miranda Tabak, 2010. "Delegated portfolio management and risk-taking behavior," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 353-372.
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-12-19 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-12-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Francisco Marcos Rodrigues Figueiredo).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.