To Link or Not To Link? Netting and Exposures Between Central Counterparties
AbstractThis paper provides a framework to compare linked and unlinked CCP configurations in terms of total netting achieved by market participants and the total system default exposures that exist between participants and CCPs. A total system perspective, taking both market participant and CCP exposures into account, is required to answer an important policy question faced by some smaller jurisdictions: whether or not to consider linking a domestic CCP with one or more offshore CCPs. Generally, a single global CCP results in the lowest total system exposure as it allows for multilateral netting across all participants while avoiding the creation of inter-CCP exposures via links. However, global clearing may not be appropriate for all markets. Using a two country model, with a global CCP serving both markets and a local CCP clearing only domestic country participants’ transactions, we show that establishing links between two CCPs leads to higher exposures for the domestic CCP and can result in a decrease in overall netting efficiency and higher total system exposures when the number of participants at the local CCP is small relative to the number of participants at the global CCP. As the relative weight applied by decision makers to CCP exposures as compared to market participants’ exposures increases, so does the number of domestic participants required to make the linked case preferred from a total system perspective. Our results imply that the establishment of a link between a small domestic CCP and a larger global CCP is unlikely to be desirable from a total system perspective in the majority of cases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Canada in its series Working Papers with number 13-6.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
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Payment clearing and settlement systems;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-23 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jürg Mägerle & Thomas Nellen, 2011. "Interoperability between central counterparties," Working Papers 2011-12, Swiss National Bank.
- Duffie, Darrell & Scheicher, Martin & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2014.
"Central clearing and collateral demand,"
Working Paper Series
1638, European Central Bank.
- Ronald W.Anderson & Karin Jõeveer, 2014. "The Economics of Collateral," FMG Discussion Papers dp732, Financial Markets Group.
- Nathanael Cox & Nicholas Garvin & Gerard Kelly, 2013. "Central Counterparty Links and Clearing System Exposures," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2013-12, Reserve Bank of Australia.
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