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Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility: An Update

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Author Info
Oleksiy Kryvtsov
Malik Shukayev
Alexander Ueberfeldt

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Abstract

This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit this issue by introducing imperfect credibility, which is modeled as gradual adjustment of the private sector's beliefs about the policy change. We find that gains from switching to price-level targeting are small. A welfare loss occurs, if imperfect credibility is highly persistent.

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File URL: http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/res/wp/2008/wp08-37.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank of Canada in its series Working Papers with number 08-37.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:08-37

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Related research
Keywords: Credibility; Monetary policy framework;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Michael Woodford & Pierpaolo Benigno, 2004. "Inflation Stabilization and Welfare: The Case of a Distorted Steady State," 2004 Meeting Papers 481, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    Other versions:
  2. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Yetman, James, 2005. "The credibility of the monetary policy "free lunch"," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 434-451, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central-bank communication and policy effectiveness," Discussion Papers 0506-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Vestin, David, 2000. "Price-level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting in a Forward-looking Model," Working Paper Series 106, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
  7. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument," NBER Working Papers 13398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Andrew Atkeson & Vyjayanthi Chari & Patrick Kehoe, 2007. "The Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument," Working Papers CAS_RN_2007_1, Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  10. Peter N. Ireland, 2004. "Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model," NBER Working Papers 10309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Ascari, Guido, 2003. "Staggered prices and trend inflation: some nuisances," Research Discussion Papers 27/2003, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Debortoli, Davide & Nunes, Ricardo, 2006. "On Linear Quadratic Approximations," MPRA Paper 544, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
  13. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2006. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(7), pages 1877-1905, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2007. "Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 728-752, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Almeida, Heitor & Bonomo, Marco, 2002. "Optimal state-dependent rules, credibility, and inflation inertia," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1317-1336, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paul R. Masson & Malik D. Shukayev, 2008. "Are Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard," Working Papers 08-27, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

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