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The Welfare Implications of Fiscal Dominance

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  • Carlos De Resende
  • Nooman Rebei

Abstract

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policy in a DSGE model with sticky prices and non-zero trend inflation. We characterize the fiscal and monetary policies by a rule whereby a given fraction k of the government debt must be backed by the discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining fraction of debt is backed by seigniorage revenues. When k = 1, there is no fiscal dominance, since the fiscal authority backs all debt and accommodates (independent) monetary policy, by adjusting current or future primary surpluses to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. If k = 0, all debt is backed by the monetary authority and there is complete fiscal dominance. A continuum of possibilities lies between these two polar cases. We numerically show that: 1) the degree of fiscal dominance, as measured by (1 - k), is positively related to trend inflation, and 2) when prices are sticky, k has significant effects on the business cycle dynamics. The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques. Estimates of k imply a high degree of fiscal dominance in both Mexico and South Korea, but almost no fiscal dominance in Canada and the U.S. The country-specific estimates of the structural parameters are used in a second-order approximation of the equilibrium around the deterministic steady-state to evaluate the welfare costs of fiscal dominance. Results suggest significant welfare losses for countries with high degrees of fiscal dominance.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos De Resende & Nooman Rebei, 2008. "The Welfare Implications of Fiscal Dominance," Staff Working Papers 08-28, Bank of Canada.
    • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:08-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tersoo Shimonkabir SHITILE & Abubakar SULE, 2019. "Welfare Effect of Monetary Financing," Applied Economics and Finance, Redfame publishing, vol. 6(5), pages 145-157, September.
    2. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    4. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Daly, Hounaida & Smida, Mounir, 2013. "Interaction entre politique monétaire et politique budgétaire:Cas de la Grèce [Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions : The Greece Case]," MPRA Paper 45931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Essiane, Patrick-Nelson Daniel, 2018. "Autonomie des Banques Centrales et Finances Publiques en Afrique subsaharienne [Autonomy of Central Banks and Public Finances in Sub-saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper 100828, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Daly, Hounaida & Smida, Mounir, 2013. "La coordination des politiques monétaire et budgétaire: Aperçu théorique [Coordination of monetary and fiscal policies: Theoretical Overview]," MPRA Paper 48020, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ruslan Aliyev, 2012. "Monetary Policy in Resource-Rich Developing Economies," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp466, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    9. Moiseev, S., 2018. "The Independence of Central Bank: Concept, Methods and Impact of Global Financial Crisis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 110-136.
    10. Áydano Ribeiro Leite & Cássio da Bessaria Nobrega & André Luis Mota dos Santos & Fernando Fernandes Neto, 2022. "Regra do teto dos gastos públicos (PEC 55/241) e sustentabilidade da dívida pública no Brasil: Análise de cenários a partir de um modelo DSGE [Public spending celing rule (PEC 55/241) and public de," Estudios Economicos, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economia, vol. 39(79), pages 219-247, july-dece.
    11. Daly, Hounaida & Smida, Mounir, 2014. "Fiscal Theory of Price Level," MPRA Paper 60142, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic models; Fiscal policy; Inflation: costs and benefits; Monetary policy framework;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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