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The Welfare Implications of Fiscal Dominance

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  • Carlos De Resende
  • Nooman Rebei

Abstract

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policy in a DSGE model with sticky prices and non-zero trend inflation. We characterize the fiscal and monetary policies by a rule whereby a given fraction k of the government debt must be backed by the discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining fraction of debt is backed by seigniorage revenues. When k = 1, there is no fiscal dominance, since the fiscal authority backs all debt and accommodates (independent) monetary policy, by adjusting current or future primary surpluses to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. If k = 0, all debt is backed by the monetary authority and there is complete fiscal dominance. A continuum of possibilities lies between these two polar cases. We numerically show that: 1) the degree of fiscal dominance, as measured by (1 - k), is positively related to trend inflation, and 2) when prices are sticky, k has significant effects on the business cycle dynamics. The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques. Estimates of k imply a high degree of fiscal dominance in both Mexico and South Korea, but almost no fiscal dominance in Canada and the U.S. The country-specific estimates of the structural parameters are used in a second-order approximation of the equilibrium around the deterministic steady-state to evaluate the welfare costs of fiscal dominance. Results suggest significant welfare losses for countries with high degrees of fiscal dominance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bank of Canada in its series Working Papers with number 08-28.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:08-28

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Keywords: Economic models; Fiscal policy; Inflation: costs and benefits; Monetary policy framework;

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References

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  1. Evan Tanner & Alberto Ramos, 2003. "Fiscal sustainability and monetary versus fiscal dominance: evidence from Brazil, 1991-2000," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(7), pages 859-873.
  2. Michael Woodford, 1995. "Price Level Determinacy Without Control of a Monetary Aggregate," NBER Working Papers 5204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Uribe, Martin, 2006. "A fiscal theory of sovereign risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1857-1875, November.
  4. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2004. "Optimal Operational Monetary Policy in the Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans Model of the U.S. Business Cycle," NBER Working Papers 10724, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2001. "Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series 511, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Frank Smets & Raf Wouters, 2002. "An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the euro area," Working Paper Research 35, National Bank of Belgium.
  7. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  8. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2005. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Model: Expanded Version," NBER Working Papers 11417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Daly, Hounaida & Smida, Mounir, 2013. "La coordination des politiques monétaire et budgétaire: Aperçu théorique
    [Coordination of monetary and fiscal policies: Theoretical Overview]
    ," MPRA Paper 48066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Ruslan Aliyev, 2012. "Monetary Policy in Resource-Rich Developing Economies," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp466, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  3. Daly, Hounaida & Smida, Mounir, 2013. "Interaction entre politique monétaire et politique budgétaire:Cas de la Grèce
    [Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions : The Greece Case]
    ," MPRA Paper 45931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.

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