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Uninformative Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions

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Author Info
Arup Daripa (Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, Birkbeck)

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Abstract

I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit commonvalue uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information collection, even if there are a large number of other bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no bidder collects information.

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File URL: http://www.ems.bbk.ac.uk/research/wp/PDF/BWPEF0701.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics in its series Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance with number 0701.

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Date of creation: Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0701

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Related research
Keywords: Costly information acquisition; uniform price auction; uninformed bidders; uninformative equilibrium;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

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