This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alberto Bayo-Moriones () (Departamento de Gestión de Empresas, Universidad Pública de Navarra)
Pedro Ortín-Ángel () (Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Abstract

An analysis is carried out in a sample of 738 industrial plants of the determining factors in the use of internal promotion of blue-collar workers to middle managers and skilled technicians as against their external recruitment. The use of internal promotion is positively correlated with variables indicative of the efforts made by plants to measure employees' skills, and to a lesser extent, with the level of specificity of investments in human capital made by blue-collar workers. Contrary to what was expected, variables related with the use and efficiency of other incentive systems have no significant influence on the increased or decreased use of internal promotion. These results are initial evidence that internal promotions are used to protect and favour specific investments, especially those made by firms in order to discover their workers' skills.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/documents/03-3.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2003
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona in its series Working Papers with number 200303.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bbe:wpaper:200303

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vall�s)
Phone: 34 93 581 1209
Fax: 34 93 581 2555
Email:
Web page: http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Antoni Vendrell Soriguera).

Related research
Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Pedro Ortin-Angel & Vicente Salas-Fumas, 2002. "Compensation and Span of Control in Hierarchical Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 848-876, October. [Downloadable!]
  2. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Harris, Milton & Holstrom, Bengt, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(3), pages 315-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Broder, Ivy E, 1993. "Professional Achievements and Gender Differences among Academic Economists," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 116-27, January.
  6. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 523-34, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David Scoones & Dan Bernhardt, 1991. "Promotion, Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers," Working Papers 817, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  8. Asch, Beth J & Warner, John T, 2001. "A Theory of Compensation and Personnel Policy in Hierarchical Organizations with Application to the United States Military," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 523-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    Other versions:
  10. Paul Osterman, 1994. "How common is workplace transformation and who adopts it?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 47(2), pages 173-188, January.
  11. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-99, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Emilio Huerta-Arribas, 2002. "The Adoption of Production Incentives in Spain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 709-724, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Levine, David I, 1993. "Worth Waiting For? Delayed Compensation, Training, and Turnover in the United States and Japan," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 724-52, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Katharine G. Abraham & James L. Medoff, 1985. "Length of service and promotions in union and nonunion work groups," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 38(3), pages 408-420, April.
  15. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-70, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Gibbs, Michael, 1995. "Incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 247-277, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Baker, George & Gibbs, Michael & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Waldman, Michael, 1984. "Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 95-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Treble, John & van Gameren, Edwin & Bridges, Sarah & Barmby, Tim, 2001. "The internal economics of the firm: further evidence from personnel data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(5), pages 531-552, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Topel, Robert H, 1991. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 145-76, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Milbourn, Todd T & Shockley, Richard L & Thakor, Anjan V, 2001. "Managerial Career Concerns and Investments in Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 334-51, Summer.
  26. Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  27. Drago, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Spence, Michael, 1976. "Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(1), pages 51-74, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 1996. "Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 838-68, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. McCue, Kristin, 1996. "Promotions and Wage Growth," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 175-209, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.