Jesus Getan Jesus Montes (Universitat de Barcelona)
Abstract
Cooperative TU-games with large core were introduced by Sharkey (1982) and the concept of Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme was defined by Sprumont (1990). Linking these two concepts, Moulin (1990) introduces the notion of large monotonic core giving a characterization for three-player games. In this paper we prove that all games with large monotonic core are convex. We give an effective criterion to determine whether a game has large monotonic core and, as a consequence, we obtain a characterization for the four-player case.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number
193.
Length: 20 pages Date of creation: 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2008193
Contact details of provider: Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain. Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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