A model of regional equalisation transfers under asymmetric information with reference to the spanish regional financing system
AbstractThis paper considers the design of equalisation transfers in the presence of asymmetric information with respect to the provision cost of regional public output (Adverse selection). To overcome this problem, the central layer of government has to design an optimal incentive-compatible direct co-ordination mechanism. This provokes a distortion in the (optimal) private decisions of the high-cost type governments in order to opt to the transfers. Moreover, both levels of government levy a tax on labour income in such a way that a vertical tax externality also crops out, and affects private decisions of high and low-cost type regions. The model which will infer such results is a preliminary attempt, open to future research, to approximate to the present Spanish situation, and achieve useful recommendations based on economic theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 26.
Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de CiÃ¨ncies EconÃ²miques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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