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A Model of Partial Regulation in the Maritime Ferry Industry

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Author Info
Angela S. Bergantino () (University of Bari, Department of Economics, Via C. Rosalba, 53, 70124 Bari (Italy))
Etienne Billette de Villemeur () (University of Toulouse, IDEI and GREMAQ, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont)
Annalisa Vinella () (University of Toulouse, GREMAQ, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont)

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Abstract

In this paper, we study how maritime ferry industries should be regulated. This is a fundamental issue in so far as maritime transport between islands and mainland is a service of general interest. We argue that the policy design crucially depends on the goals the collectivity pursues (pure e¢ ciency, fairness) as well as on the relevant industry structure (monopoly, oligopoly). We show that the regulator needs to prevent ine¢ cient crowding out, whenever room exists for access of new providers to former monopolies. By properly allocating tra¢ c across shippers, the regulated firm's budget constraint can then be relaxed. We subsequently shed light on the implications of adopting the territorial continuity principle to boost social fairness. We establish that the incumbent's public service obligations dump the entrant's incentives to provide connections in the low season; conversely, soft competition encourages the entrant to operate in the high season, when it pockets a net rent. As to customers, our model predicts that the islanders, whose consumption is partly subsidized by the non-residents, patronize the incumbent and that liberalization directly benefits the non-residents who switch to the entrant.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche - Università di Bari in its series series with number 0010.

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Length: 41
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision: Feb 2006
Handle: RePEc:bai:series:wp0010

Note: We gratefully acknowledge comments from the participants at the XVII Scientific Meeting of the Soci- età Italiana di Economia Pubblica (University of Pavia) and the 4th Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research (WIP Center, Berlin University of Technology). We would like to thank David Gillen for partic- ularly useful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
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Postal: Via Camillo Rosalba, 53 - 70124 - Bari ITALY
Phone: +390805049042
Fax: +390805049149
Web page: http://www.dse.uniba.it
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Related research
Keywords: Maritime transport; Price and frequency; Partial regulation; Territorial;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
R48 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Government Pricing; Regulatory Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1989. "The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 283-301, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Cremer, Helmuth & De Rycke, Marc & Grimaud, Andre, 1997. "Service Quality, Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 5-19, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. De Fraja, Gianni & Iozzi, Alberto, 2004. "Bigger and Better: A Dynamic Regulatory Mechanism for Optimum Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 4502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Delipalla, Sofia & Keen, Michael, 1992. "The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Herbert Mohring & John Schroeter & Paitoon Wiboonchutikula, 1987. "The Values of Waiting Time, Travel Time, and a Seat on a Bus," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 40-56, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne, et al, 2003. "Optimal Pricing and Price-Cap Regulation in the Postal Sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 49-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Cremer, Helmuth, et al, 2001. "Entry and Competition in the Postal Market: Foundations for the Construction of Entry Scenarios," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 107-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bergantino, Angela Stefania & De Villemeur, Étienne & Vinella, Annalisa, 2007. "Partial Regulation in Vertically Differentiated Industries," IDEI Working Papers 502, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jun 2009. [Downloadable!]
  2. Valerio Gatta & Edoardo Marcucci, 2007. "Quality and Public Transport Service Contracts," Working Papers 0708, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
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