Pocketing and Deceiving: The Behavior of Agency in a Donor - Delivery Agency - Recipient Organization
AbstractThis paper presents a simple model to analyze the corrupt behavior of the delivery agency in a donor-delivery agency-recipient organization. Corrupt behavior of the delivery agency can take two forms: (i) “pocketing” or where the delivery agency distributes only a portion of the relief fund to the recipient and keeps the remaining fund to itself, and (ii) “deceiving”, where the delivery agency provides false information to the donor regarding the need of the recipient. We show that both forms of behavior can emerge as equilibrium outcomes in this type of organization. We identify factors that influence such corrupt behaviors and draw some policy implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper0613.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2006
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Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
funds transfers; corrupt behaviors; donor organization; recipient organization; deliver organization;
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"Aid, policies, and growth,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1777, The World Bank.
- Alesina, Alberto & Weder, Beatrice, 2002.
"Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?,"
4553011, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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