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Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

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Author Info
Guido Friebel () (Toulouse School of Economics)
Wendelin Schnedler () (University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics)

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Abstract

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to assure certain efforts may have destructive effects: they can distort the way workers perceive their fellow workers and they may also lead to a reduction of effort by those workers that care most about output. Moreover, interventions may hinder the development of a cooperative organizational culture in which workers trust each other. Thus, our framework provides some first insights into the costs and benefits of interventions in teams. It identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks, the more likely it is that teams are empowered.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0457.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision: Oct 2007
Handle: RePEc:awi:wpaper:0457

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Related research
Keywords: team work; incentives; informed principal; intrinsic motivation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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  3. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Seabright, Paul, 2004. "Continuous Preferences Can Cause Discontinuous Choices: An Application to the Impact of Incentives on Altruism," CEPR Discussion Papers 4322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Wendelin Schnedler & Radovan Vadovic, 2007. "Legitimacy of Control," IZA Discussion Papers 3013, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008. "Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-17, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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