The New Battle of the Sexes: Understanding the Reversal of the Happiness Gender Gap
AbstractIn the Paradox of Declining Female Happiness, Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) document a new “gender gap” between the sexes, in which women today generally report lower subjective well-being relative to men. Motivated by recent work on gender-specific preferences, this paper considers whether changes in contraceptive technology, and the Pill especially, may have played some role in the declining relative (self-reported) happiness of women. We examine a simple model in which men and women have different preferences over sex and children. We find that plausible differences in male-female preference structures can yield the observed reversal in relative happiness following the introduction of a single technology which may prevent conception but yields no disutility to men. We attempt to characterize the fundamental tradeoffs in a static game of complete information, and make some extensions to repeated games. We find that preference structures substantially change the way in which the Pill may affect bargaining power and outcomes. The model suggests that men may have benefited more than women from the Pill in particular, and raises the question of whether other forms of family planning might better equalize the relative positions of men and women in partnerships. These results have particular relevance for feminist critiques of the sexual revolution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ave Maria University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1004.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
simultaneous game; contraception; fertility; gender; female happiness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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