Would You Like to Be a Prosumer? Information Revelation, Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets
AbstractElectronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyse how his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 242.
Date of creation: Jul 2003
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E-Commerce; Personalization; Asymmetric information; Price discrimination;
Other versions of this item:
- Martin Bandulet & Karl Morasch, 2005. "Would You Like to be a Prosumer? Information Revelation, Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 251-271.
- Morasch, Karl & Bandulet, Martin, 2003. "Would you like to be a prosumer? Information revelation, personalization and price discrimination in electronic markets," Working Papers in Economics 2003,4, Universität der Bundeswehr München, Economic Research Group.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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