This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
M. Pilar Socorro ()
Abstract

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2003/57003.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 570.03.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 31
Date of creation: 02 May 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:570.03

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Xavier Vila).

Related research
Keywords: RJV; moral hazard; adverse selection; subsidies; monitoring;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Government Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-77, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Perez-Castrillo, J.D. & Verdier, T., 1989. "On Subsidizing R&D," DELTA Working Papers 89-08, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  4. Tripsas, Mary & Schrader, Stephan & Sobrero, Maurizio, 1995. "Discouraging opportunistic behavior in collaborative R & D: A new role for government," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 367-389, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Picard Pierre & Rey Patrick, 1987. "Incentives in cooperative research and development," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8739, CEPREMAP.
  6. Morasch, Karl, 1995. "Moral hazard and optimal contract form for R&D cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Choi, Jay Pil, 1992. "Cooperative R&D with moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 485-491, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Tao, Zhigang, 1998. "Contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 391-413, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Romano, Richard E, 1989. "Aspects of R&D Subsidization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 863-73, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Beath, John & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Ulph, David, 1998. "Organization Design and Information-Sharing in a Research Joint Venture with Spillovers," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(1), pages 47-59, January.
  11. Kesteloot, Katrien & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1995. "Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(4), pages 651-72, Winter.
  12. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Gandal, N. & Scotchmer, S., 1989. "Coordinating Research Through Research Joint Ventures," Papers e-89-27, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
  15. Perez-Castrillo, J. David & Sandonis, Joel, 1997. "Disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 51-75, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Leyden, Dennis Patrick & Link, Albert N., 1999. "Federal laboratories as research partners," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-592, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Stenbacka, Rune & Tombak, Mihkel M., 1998. "Technology policy and the organization of R&D," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 503-520, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Vislie, Jon, 1994. "Efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 83-91, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Radner, Roy, 1991. "Dynamic games in organization theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 217-260, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Karen Adleberger, 1999. "A Developmental German State? Explaining Growth in German Biotechnology and Venture Capital," UCAIS Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, Working Paper Series 1026, UCAIS Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  21. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1985. "Tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in Sweden," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 331-353, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.