We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a)the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this approximation; (b) the size of approximately effective small groups; (c) the size of the bound on maximal per capita payoffs achievable in coalitions; and (d) a measure on the extent to which the payoff sets of the game are bounded away from being "flat".
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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
394.97.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making