Strategic Price Rigidity
AbstractThis paper explores how costly price adjustment and strategic interaction may cause a leader-follower configuration to arise. While most imperfect models predict that price-setters will synchronize their moves, we show that leadership generates stable staggering.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 361.96.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
PRICING; MARKET; MACROECONOMICS; OLIGOPOLIES; PRODUCTION;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
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