We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regular cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed.
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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
340.96.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
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