Implementation in economies with a Continuum of Agents
AbstractThe authors study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information, and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies. Assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy, the authors consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self-selective (first- and second-best) allocations. An upper hemicontinuity property of Bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated. Copyright 1993 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 129.90.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
game theory ; economic models;
Other versions of this item:
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Vives, Xavier, 1993. "Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 613-29, July.
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