Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria In Continuous Time Games
AbstractThis paper develops a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information. This model bridges the gap between the differential formulation of a continuous time game and the procedure of taking limits with respect to discrete time games. The model admits a large class of strategies. As a result, the set of equilibria is large -- roughly equal to the set given by the folk theorem. In addition, we define the concept of renegotiation proof equilibrium in this context and characterize the set of renegotiation proof equilibria of the game.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 124-89.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
game theory ; economic models ; economic equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- James Bergin & Bentley MacLeod, 1989. "Renegotiation Proof Equilibria in Continuous Time Games," Working Papers 753, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xavier Vila).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.