The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers
AbstractThis paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who may be budget-constrained. Unlike the case where buyers are not budget constrained, a single posted price is not typically optimal. An optimal mechanism generally consists of a continuum of lotteries indexed by the probability of comsumption and the entry fee.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 9415r.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.
Other versions of this item:
- Che, Y.K. & Gale, I., 1996. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers," Working papers 9609, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Che, Y.K. & Gale, I.,, 1994. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers," Working papers 9415, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- GAUTIER, Axel & MITRA, Manipushpak, 2003.
"Financing infrastructure under budget constraints,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2003037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mark Armstrong & David Sappington, 2005.
"Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,"
0505011, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 2005.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ailsenne Sumwalt).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.