Continuous Reaction Functions In Duopolies
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 90-25.
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 1990
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.
economic equilibrium ; strategies ; oligopolies;
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- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2006. "Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 199, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Shaffer, Sherrill & Shogren, Jason F., 2009.
"Repeated contests: A general parameterization,"
Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 159-161, November.
- Sherrill Shaffer, 2000. "Correlation Tests for Competitive and Cournot Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 313-318, May.
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