Dividing the indivisible : procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system

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Dividing the indivisible : procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system

Author Info

Brams,S.L.
Kaplan,T.R. (University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics)

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Steven J. Brams

Abstract

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Paper provided by University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working papers with number 340.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:att:bielme:2002340

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Keywords: parliament

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Brams, S.J. & Kaplan, T.R., 2002. "Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System," Working Papers 02-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2002-12-31 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2002-12-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-HIS-2002-12-31 (Business, Economic & Financial History)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Fair Division of Indivisible Items," Working Papers 00-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Steven J. Brams & Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn, 2003. "Fair Division Of Indivisible Items," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 147-180, 09. [Downloadable!]
Friedrich Pukelsheim & Albert W. Marshall & Ingram Olkin, 2002. "A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 885-900. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2001. "Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(3), pages 313-29, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dorothea Herreiner & Clemens Puppe, 2002. "A simple procedure for finding equitable allocations of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 415-430. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Paradoxes of Fair Division," Working Papers 00-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Edelman, Paul & Fishburn, Peter, 2001. "Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 327-347, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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