Inheritance, Equal Division and Rent Seeking
AbstractWe examine bequest-sharing rules where wasteful competition for bequests is possible by children. We show that equal division minimizes rent-seeking expenditures by siblings. Finally, we employ a theory of rational social norms in order to discuss the evolution of bequest norms in the Middle Ages from primogeniture to partible inheritances in some parts of Western Europe.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University in its series Working Papers with number 2133341.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-14 (All new papers)
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- Yang-Ming Chang, 2007. "Transfers and bequests: a portfolio analysis in a Nash game," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 277-295, March.
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