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Bankruptcy Risk Induced by Career Concerns of Regulators

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  • Godfrey Charles-Cadogan
  • John A. Cole
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    Abstract

    We introduce a model in which a regulator employs mechanism design to embed her human capital beta signal(s) in a firm's capital structure, in order to enhance the value of her post career change indexed executive stock option contract with the firm. We prove that the agency cost of this revolving door behavior increases the firm's financial leverage, bankruptcy risk, and affects estimation of firm value at risk (VaR).

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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.7346
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by arXiv.org in its series Papers with number 1312.7346.

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    Date of creation: Dec 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1312.7346

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    Web page: http://arxiv.org/

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