Nash equilibrium for coupling of CO2 allowances and electricity markets
AbstractIn this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions covered.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by arXiv.org in its series Papers with number 1311.1535.
Date of creation: Nov 2013
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Web page: http://arxiv.org/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2013-11-09 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-11-09 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-REG-2013-11-09 (Regulation)
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