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Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter

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Author Info
Kletzer, Kenneth Miles, Jr.
Wright, Brian D.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 761.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 1995
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Publication status: Published in American economic review, v.90:3, June 2000, p.621-639
Handle: RePEc:are:cudare:761

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Keywords: Credit Debt International finance

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Debt with potential repudiation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 1099-1109, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, 1987. "Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships," Working papers 468, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  5. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Working Papers 1894, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1989. "Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(1), pages 3-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995. "Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Eaton, Jonathan & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Sanctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 899-928, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Craig, Barbara J., 1994. "Heterogeneity and intertemporal trade: finding support for international credit contracts," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 171-189, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Thomas, J. P., 1992. "Sovereign debt: Ignorance can be bliss," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 389-396, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1990. "Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment in Contracting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 597-619, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ray Debraj, 1994. "Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 162-177, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Eaton, J., 1990. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation, And Credit Terms," Papers 223, Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research.
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  19. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1988. "Settling Defaults in the Era of Bond Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(1), pages 175-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Ozler, Sule, 1993. "Have Commercial Banks Ignored History?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 608-20, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Kletzer, Ken & Newbery, David M & Wright, Brian D, 1992. "Smoothing Primary Exporters' Price Risks: Bonds, Futures, Options and Insurance," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 641-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Kletzer, Kenneth, 1989. "Inefficient Private Renegotiation of Sovereign Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Cole, Harold L. & English, William B., 1992. "Two-sided expropriation and international equity contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 77-104, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(4), pages 865-88, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  31. Kletzer, Kenneth Miles, Jr. & Wright, Brian D., 1995. "Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter," CUDARE Working Paper Series 761, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
    Other versions:
  32. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-97, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  33. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation spillover across relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 209, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  34. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 198, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  35. Fernandez, Raquel & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 331-49, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 5131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  37. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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