Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Predatory versus productive government : the case of U.S. agricultural policies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rausser, Gordon C.

    ()
    (University of California, Berkeley. Dept of agricultural and resource economics)

Abstract

This essay will argue that agricultural policy in the United States has led to both the enhancement of efficiency through "productive policies" and the transfer of wealth and income to special interests through redistributive or "predatory policies." These two activities can be labeled as PESTs and PERTs. PEST policies, or political-economic-seeking transfers, are meant to redistribute wealth from one social group to another and are not explicitly concerned with efficiency. In contrast, PERTs, or political-economic resource transactions, are intended to correct market failures or to provide public goods; these policies have neutral distributional effects, at least in design. A review of the history of public policy in agriculture reveals not only tension between the PERT and PEST roles of the public sector, but also some coordination between these two types of activities. As different interest groups pressure the political process, the government trades off PESTs and PERTs in its attempts to acquire, balance, and secure political power. At times this has led to combinations of programs that appear incoherent. In such a world, the challenge for economists is to design and advocate policies that are both economically productive and politically sustainable.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/21913950
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 613.

as in new window
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:are:cudare:613

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 207 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley, CA 94720-3310
Phone: (510) 642-3345
Fax: (510) 643-8911
Web page: http://areweb.berkeley.edu/library/Main/CUDARE
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: University of California, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Library, 248 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley CA 94720-3310
Email:

Related research

Keywords: perts;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Love, H. Alan & Foster, William E., 1990. "Commodity Program Slippage Rates For Corn And Wheat," Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 15(02), December.
  2. Foster, William E. & Rausser, Gordon C., 1990. "Price-distorting compensation serving the public interest," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt9z03s3x1, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  3. Rausser, Gordon C., 1982. "Political economic markets: PERTS and PESTS in food and agriculture," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt6ct5s49t, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  4. Gary S. Becker, 1984. "Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  5. Rausser, Gordon C. & de Gorter, Harry, 1988. "Endogenizing policy in models of agricultural markets," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt18z7n1qz, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  6. Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(2), pages 447-62, June.
  7. Rausser, Gordon C. & Lapan, Harvey E, 1980. "Natural resources, goods, bads and alternative institutional frameworks," CUDARE Working Paper Series 89, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
  8. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  9. Rausser, Gordon C. & James, Chalfant A. & Love, H. Alan & Stamoulis, Kostas G., 1986. "Macroeconomic linkages, taxes, and subsidies in the U.S. agricultural sector," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt1nj635tk, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  10. Rausser, Gordon C, 1974. "Technological Change, Production, and Investment in Natural Resource Industries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 1049-59, December.
  11. Gardner, Bruce L, 1987. "Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(2), pages 290-310, April.
  12. Hochman, Eithan & Zilberman, David, 1978. "Examination of Environmental Policies Using Production and Pollution Microparameter Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 739-60, July.
  13. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
  14. Gordon Rausser & Richard Howitt, 1975. "Microeconomics: Stochastic Control of Environmental Externalities," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 4, number 2, pages 271-292 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:are:cudare:613. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jeff Cole).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.