The Value of social networks in rural Paraguay
AbstractWe conduct field experiments in rural Paraguay to measure the value of reciprocity within social networks in a set of fifteen villages. These experiments involve conducting dictator- type games; different treatments involve manipulating the information and choice that individuals have in the game. These different treatments allow us to measure and distinguish between different motives for giving in these games. The different motives we're able to measure include a general benevolence, directed altruism, fear of sanctions, and reciprocity within the social network. We're further able to draw inferences from play in the games regarding the sorts of impediments to trade which must restrict villagers' ability to share in states of the world when no researchers are present running experiments and measuring outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 1116.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
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Postal: University of California, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Library, 248 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley CA 94720-3310
Other versions of this item:
- Ligon, Ethan A. & Schechter, Laura, 2011. "The Value of social networks in rural Paraguay," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7507w5zw, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- NEP-AGR-2012-02-20 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2012-02-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-02-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2012-02-20 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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