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Incentives and nutrition for rotten kids: intrahousehold food allocation in the Philippines

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  • Dubois, Pierre
  • Ligon, Ethan A.

    ()
    (University of California, Berkeley. Dept of agricultural and resource economics)

Abstract

Using data on individual consumption expenditures from a sample of farm households in the Philippines, we construct a direct test of the risk-sharing implications of the collective household model. We are able to contrast the efficient outcomes predicted by the collective household model with the outcomes we might expect in environments in which food consumption delivers not only utils, but also nutrients which affect future productivity. Finally, we are able to contrast each of these two models with a third, involving a hidden action problem within the household; in this case, the efficient provision of incentives implies that the consumption of each household member depends on their (stochastic) productivity. The efficiency conditions which characterize the within-household allocation of food under the collective household model are violated, as consumption shares respond to earnings shocks. If future productivity depends on current nutrition, then this can explain some but not all of the response, as it appears that the quality of current consumption depends on past earnings. This suggests that some actions taken by household members are private, giving rise to a moral hazard problem within the household.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 1114.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:are:cudare:1114

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  1. Foster, Andrew D & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 213-27, May.
  2. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
  3. Browning, Martin & Francois Bourguignon & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Valerie Lechene, 1994. "Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1067-96, December.
  4. A. L. Robb & L. Magee & J. B. Burbidge, 1992. "Kernel Smoothed Consumption-Age Quantiles," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(3), pages 669-80, August.
  5. Duncan Thomas, 1990. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 635-664.
  6. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Spear, Stephen E & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617, October.
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Cited by:
  1. De Weerdt, Joachim & Dercon, Stefan, 2006. "Risk-sharing networks and insurance against illness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 337-356, December.
  2. Robinson, Jonathan, 2008. "Limited Insurance Within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya," MPRA Paper 8314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Dean Yang, 2009. "International Migration and Human Development," Human Development Research Papers (2009 to present) HDRP-2009-29, Human Development Report Office (HDRO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), revised Jul 2009.
  4. Gary Charness, University of California, Santa Barbara and Garance Genicot,Georgetown University, 2004. "An Experimental Test of Risk-Sharing Arrangements," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Charness, Gary B & Genicot, Garance, 2008. "Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite-horizon Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt9sn8t91g, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  7. Joost de Laat, 2008. "Household Allocations and Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0827, CIRPEE.

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