Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A proposal to reform the Kyoto Protocol : the role of escape clauses and foresight

Contents:

Author Info

  • Karp, Larry

    ()
    (University of California, Berkeley. Dept of agricultural and resource economics and policy)

  • Zhao, Jinhua

Abstract

A reform to the Kyoto Protocol that allows signatories to pay a fine instead of meeting the target level of abatement would achieve three goals. First, it would defuse one U.S. objection to the agreement: the concern that the cost of achieving the target might turn out to be extremely high. Second, unlike other cost-reducing measures (such as trade in pollution permits) it would increase the equilibrium number of signatories in a non-cooperative participation game. Third, it would make it easier to force signatories to comply with their obligations. We study the participation game under an escape clause using both a Nash Equilibrium and the concept of a stable set when nations are “farsightedâ€. We compare our results to a prominent model of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) which finds that the equilibrium size of an IEA tends to be small when the benefits of cooperation are large. We show that with an escape clause and a properly chosen level of fine, a large IEA can be formed even when the benefits of cooperation are large.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/are_ucb/1050
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 1050.

as in new window
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:are:cudare:1050

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 207 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley, CA 94720-3310
Phone: (510) 642-3345
Fax: (510) 643-8911
Web page: http://areweb.berkeley.edu/library/Main/CUDARE
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: University of California, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Library, 248 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley CA 94720-3310
Email:

Related research

Keywords: kyoto protocol game theory;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Stiglitz Joseph, 2006. "A New Agenda for Global Warming," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(7), pages 1-4, July.
  2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, . "International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight," Economics Working Papers, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus 2002-10, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  3. Hoel, Michael & Karp, Larry, 2001. "Taxes and quotas for a stock pollutant with multiplicative uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 91-114, October.
  4. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, 2011. "The Economics of Hate," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 69(4), pages 534-537, December.
  5. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
  6. de Zeeuw, Aart, 2008. "Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 163-174, March.
  7. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  8. Mariotti, Marco, 1997. "A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 196-217, May.
  9. Johan Eyckmans, 2001. "On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment ete0103, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  10. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
  11. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Larry Karp & Jinhua Zhao, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements: Emissions Trade, Safety Valves and Escape Clauses," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(1), pages 153-182.
  2. Karp, Larry & Zhao, Jinhua, 2008. "A Proposal for the Design of the Successor to the Kyoto Protocol," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley qt35n7x8mt, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  3. Zeeuw, A.J. de, 2008. "Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377597, Tilburg University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:are:cudare:1050. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jeff Cole).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.