Grazing fees versus stewardship on federal lands
AbstractLivestock grazing on public lands continues to be a source of intense conflict and debate. We analyze this problem using a dynamic game. Low grazing fees let ranchers capture more rent from grazing. This increases the incentive to comply with federally mandated regulations. Optimal grazing contracts therefore include grazing fees that are lower than competitive private rates. The optimal policy also includes random monitoring to prevent strategic learning by cheating ranchers and avoid wasteful efforts to disguise noncompliant behavior. Finally, an optimal policy includes a penalty for cheating beyond terminating the lease. This penalty must be large enough that the rancher who would profit the most from cheating experiences a negative expected net return.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 1022.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: University of California, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Library, 248 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley CA 94720-3310
Other versions of this item:
- Watts, Myles J & Shimshack, Jay P & LaFrance, Jeffrey T., 2006. "Grazing Fees versus Stewardship on Federal Lands," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt26b384t9, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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