Regulatory takings and environmental regulation in NAFTA's Chapter 11
AbstractNAFTAÃ¢â¬â¢s investment treaty has led to several expropriation compensation claims from investors hurt by new environmental regulations. Expropriation clauses in international treaties solve post-investment moral hazard problems such as hold-ups. However, these clauses can interact with National Treatment clauses in a manner that hinders investment. A police powers carve-out from the definition of expropriation can be Pareto-improving and can increase the level of foreign investment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 1014.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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Other versions of this item:
- Aisbett, Emma & Karp, Larry & McAusland, Carol, 2006. "Regulatory Takings and Environmental Regulation in NAFTA's Chapter 11," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt1qh5j6dv, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
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