Garden Leave vs. Covenants not to Compete
AbstractGarden leave (GL)---when workers are paid but do not work---may be preferred by firms since courts are more likely to enforce GL than they are covenants not to compete (CNCs). We consider when GL is more profitable than a CNC. Also, assuming it is optimal to offer GL or a CNC, we find (1) the optimal length of either GL or a CNC is the same, (2) firms share fewer trade secrets with GL than with a CNC, and (3) the extent of innovation will be higher with a CNC than with GL. Key Words: Covenants not to compete; Garden leave
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 10-07.
Date of creation: 2010
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- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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- April M. Franco & Matthew F. Mitchell, 2008. "Covenants not to Compete, Labor Mobility, and Industry Dynamics," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 581-606, 09.
- Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2009. "Should You Allow Your Employee To Become Your Competitor? On Noncompete Agreements In Employment Contracts," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(1), pages 117-141, 02.
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