Time on Camera: An Alternative Explanation of NASCAR Tournaments
AbstractNASCAR’s reward structure for rank order tournaments has been considered the exception to the rule in tournament theory due to the linear payout structure. We suggest that the rewards for drivers are nonlinear when you take into consideration the value of sponsorship time on camera and sponsor mentions during a race on TV. Given the importance of corporate sponsorship in NASCAR, we suggest that performance in a race provides additional benefits that are not captured in traditional tournament payments. Key Words:
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 09-15.
Date of creation: 2009
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- Frick, Bernd & Humphreys, Brad, 2011. "Prize Structure and Performance: Evidence from NASCAR," Working Papers 2011-12, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
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