Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

EmissionTaxes and Tradable Permits: A Comparison of views on Long Run Efficiency

Contents:

Author Info

  • John C. V. Pezzey

    ()
    (Australian National University, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies)

Abstract

We compare three different views on the long run efficiencies of emission taxes which include thresholds, and of tradable emission permits where some permits are initially free. The differences are caused by different assumptions about whether thresholds and free permits should be subsidies given only to firms that produce, or full property rights. Treating tax thresholds, as well as free permits, as property rights would depart from the conventional view, but would allow greater flexibility in making economic instruments both efficient and acceptable. Such flexibility could be very important in achieving efficent control of greenhouse gas emissions.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://een.anu.edu.au/download_files/een0210.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network in its series Economics and Environment Network Working Papers with number 0210.

as in new window
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:anu:eenwps:0210

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://een.anu.edu.au/

Related research

Keywords: emission taxes; tradable permits; thresholds; exemptions; efficiency;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. M. L. Weitzman, 1973. "Prices vs. Quantities," Working papers 106, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Joskow, Paul L & Schmalensee, Richard, 1998. "The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-83, April.
  3. A. Bovenberg, 1999. "Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: an Updated Reader's Guide," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 421-443, August.
  4. Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 1999. "The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible," Papers of Peter Cramton 99eedecr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised Feb 1998.
  5. Paul Ekins & Stefan Speck, 1999. "Competitiveness and Exemptions From Environmental Taxes in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(4), pages 369-396, June.
  6. Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, 1997. "A Better Way to Slow Global Climate Change," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 9702, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
  7. John Pezzey & Andrew Park, 1998. "Reflections on the Double Dividend Debate," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 539-555, April.
  8. Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quirion, 2002. "Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences," Post-Print halshs-00007264, HAL.
  9. Donald N. Dewees, 2000. "Emissions Trading: ERCs or Allowances," Working Papers dewees-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  10. John Pezzey, 1992. "The Symmetry between Controlling Pollution by Price and Controlling It by Quantity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 25(4), pages 983-91, November.
  11. A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, 2001. "Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?," NBER Chapters, in: Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy, pages 45-90 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Pezzey, John C.V., 2003. "Emission Taxes and Tradable Permits: A Comparison of Views on Long Run Efficiency," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58198, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  13. Felder, Stefan & Schleiniger, Reto, 2002. "Environmental tax reform: efficiency and political feasibility," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 107-116, August.
  14. Hahn, Robert W, 1989. "Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 95-114, Spring.
  15. Stavins Robert N., 1995. "Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-148, September.
  16. Pizer, William A., 2002. "Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 409-434, September.
  17. Carlton, Dennis W & Loury, Glenn C, 1980. "The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 559-66, November.
  18. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
  19. Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2001. "Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number carr01-1, July.
  20. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-47, March.
  21. Kling, Catherine L. & Zhao, Jinhua, 2000. "On the Long-Run Efficiency of Auctioned vs. Free Permits," Staff General Research Papers 1836, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  22. Margaret Wilkinson, 1994. "Paying for public spending: is there a role for earmarked taxes?," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 119-35, November.
  23. Jensen, Jesper & Rasmussen, Tobias N., 2000. "Allocation of CO2 Emissions Permits: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Policy Instruments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 111-136, September.
  24. Farrow, Scott, 1999. "The duality of taxes and tradable permits: A survey with applications in Central and Eastern Europe," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(04), pages 519-535, October.
  25. Robert N. Stavins, 1998. "What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 69-88, Summer.
  26. Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard & Daugbjerg, Carsten & Hjollund, Lene & Pedersen, Anders Branth, 2001. "Consumers, industrialists and the political economy of green taxation: CO2 taxation in OECD," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 489-497, May.
  27. Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, 1997. "Salvaging the Kyoto Climate Change Negotiations," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 9704, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
  28. Ekins, Paul & Barker, Terry, 2001. " Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 325-76, July.
  29. Pizer, William, 1997. "Prices vs. Quantities Revisited: The Case of Climate Change," Discussion Papers dp-98-02, Resources For the Future.
  30. Gene Mumy, 1980. "Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 59-74, January.
  31. Farrow, Scott, 1995. "The dual political economy of taxes and tradable permits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 217-220, August.
  32. Spulber, Daniel F., 1985. "Effluent regulation and long-run optimality," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-116, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anu:eenwps:0210. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jack Pezzey) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Jack Pezzey to update the entry or send us the correct address.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.