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Voluntary R&D cooperation in experimental duopoly markets

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  • SUETENS, Sigrid

Abstract

In the paper I examine in an experiment whether for two different levels of technological spillovers, cooperative R&D behavior voluntarily arises when firms have communication possibilities. It is assumed that in the output market, firms compete `a la Cournot. Experimental results indicate that when technological spillovers are complete and subjects communicate, R&D decisions converge to the cooperative level, while in other cases R&D decisions converge towards the Nash equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003029.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2003029

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Postal: Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerpen
Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
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Keywords: R&D; Duopoly; Experiment;

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  1. Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 1997. "Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(2), pages 290-299, May.
  2. Isaac, R Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S, 1988. "Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 647-71, November.
  3. Cason, Timothy N., 1995. "Cheap talk price signaling in laboratory markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 183-204, June.
  4. Sbriglia, Patrizia & Hey, John D, 1994. "Experiments in Multi-stage R&D Competition," Empirical Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 291-316.
  5. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  6. Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2000. "Strategic R&D Co-operatives," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 153-185, June.
  7. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1995. "Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. R. Cookson, 2000. "Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 55-79, June.
  9. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December.
  10. Friedman,Daniel & Sunder,Shyam, 1994. "Experimental Methods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521456821.
  11. Park, Eun-Soo, 2000. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 405-421, December.
  12. Isaac, R. Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S., 1992. "Schumpeterian competition in experimental markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 59-100, January.
  13. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2002. "Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 436-466, October.
  14. Rabah Amir, 1998. "Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics 1998-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  15. Ronald Harstad & Stephen Martin & Hans-Theo Normann, 1997. "Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics 1997-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  16. Henriques, Irene, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 638-40, June.
  17. Petit, Maria Luisa & Tolwinski, Boleslaw, 1999. "R&D cooperation or competition?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 185-208, January.
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