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Revenue sharing and competitive balance. Does it invariance proposition hold?

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  • KÉSENNE, Stefan

Abstract

This short paper, challenging the so-called invariance proposition, argues that, for a general n-team model with profit maximizing clubs and concave revenue functions, there are reasons to believe that revenue sharing can worsen the competitive balance among teams in a professional sports league. If clubs are win maximizers, revenue sharing improves the competitive balance.

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File URL: https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container1244/files/TEW%20-%20Onderzoek/Working%20Papers/RPS/2003/RPS-2003-021.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003021.

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Length: 15 pages
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Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2003021

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Postal: Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerpen
Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
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Cited by:
  1. Michela Pierini, 2011. "Diritti Tv E Competitive Balance Nel Calcio Professionistico Italiano," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 7(2), pages 87-113, September.

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