Information Asymmetry and Traceability Incentives for Food Safety
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] in its series Anais do XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 36th Brazilian Economics Meeting] with number 200807111109520.
Date of creation: 2008
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jill E. Hobbs, 2004. "Information asymmetry and the role of traceability systems," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(4), pages 397-415.
- Robert P. King & Gé B. C. Backus & Monique A. van der Gaag, 2007. "Incentive systems for food quality control with repeated deliveries: Salmonella control in pork production," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 34(1), pages 81-104, March.
- Golan, Elise H. & Krissoff, Barry & Kuchler, Fred & Calvin, Linda & Nelson, Kenneth E. & Price, Gregory K., 2004. "Traceability In The U.S. Food Supply: Economic Theory And Industry Studies," Agricultural Economics Reports 33939, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Pierre Dubois & Tomislav Vukina, 2004.
"Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 835-841.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2003. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 248, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Rachael E. Goodhue, 2000. "Broiler Production Contracts as a Multi-Agent Problem: Common Risk, Incentives and Heterogeneity," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(3), pages 606-622.
- Saak, Alexander E., 2013. "Traceability and Reputation in Supply Chains," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149988, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
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