IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/anp/en2006/127.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Principal-Agent Model For Evaluating The Economic Value Of A Beef Traceability System: A Case Study With Injection-Site Lesions Control In Fed Cattle In The Us

Author

Listed:
  • Moisés de Andrade Resende Filho
  • Brian L. Buhr

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Moisés de Andrade Resende Filho & Brian L. Buhr, 2006. "A Principal-Agent Model For Evaluating The Economic Value Of A Beef Traceability System: A Case Study With Injection-Site Lesions Control In Fed Cattle In The Us," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 127, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2006:127
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2006/artigos/A06A127.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierre Dubois & Tomislav Vukina, 2004. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 835-841.
    2. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-276, April.
    3. S. Andrew Starbird, 2005. "Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(1), pages 15-27.
    4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    5. Antle, John M., 2001. "Economic analysis of food safety," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 19, pages 1083-1136, Elsevier.
    6. Chalfant, James A. & James, Jennifer S. & Lavoie, Nathalie & Sexton, Richard J., 1999. "Asymmetric Grading Error And Adverse Selection: Lemons In The California Prune Industry," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(1), pages 1-23, July.
    7. Bentley W. MacLeod, 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March.
    8. David A. Hennessy, 1996. "Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 1034-1043.
    9. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    10. Hennessy, David A., 1996. "Information Asymmetry As a Reason for Vertical Integration," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10422, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Peter Bogetoft & Henrik Ballebye Olesen, 2003. "Incentives, Information Systems, and Competition," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(1), pages 234-247.
    12. Robert P. King & Gé B. C. Backus & Monique A. van der Gaag, 2007. "Incentive systems for food quality control with repeated deliveries: Salmonella control in pork production," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 34(1), pages 81-104, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Resende Filho, Moises de Andrade, 2007. "A Principal-Agent Model for Investigating Traceability Systems Incentives on Food Safety," 105th Seminar, March 8-10, 2007, Bologna, Italy 7897, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Herweg, Fabian & Müller, Daniel, 2008. "The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 17/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    3. Hongli Feng & David A. Hennessy, 2009. "Production and Abatement Distortions under Noisy Green Taxes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 37-53, February.
    4. FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro, 2017. "Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs," Economics Working Papers ECO 2017/08, European University Institute.
    5. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug, 2007. "Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 303-343, February.
    6. Helmut Bester & Johannes Münster, 2016. "Subjective evaluation versus public information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(4), pages 723-753, April.
    7. Michael Ollinger & John Bovay, 2020. "Producer Response to Public Disclosure of Food‐Safety Information," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(1), pages 186-201, January.
    8. Surajeet Chakravarty, 2005. "Resolving Contractual Disputes: Arbitration vs Mediation," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/117, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    9. George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-1769, December.
    10. John A. Miranowski & Bruce A. Babcock, 2004. "Genetic Information in Agricultural Productivity and Product Development," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(1), pages 73-87.
    11. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    12. Zhou, Jiehong & Jin, Yu & Liang, Qiao, 2021. "Quality inspection, information disclosure and wholesale vendors’ traceability adoption," 2021 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Austin, Texas 313943, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    13. Crespi, John M. & Marette, Stephan, 2003. "Some Economic Implications Of Public Labeling," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 34(3), pages 1-12, November.
    14. Eric Giraud‐Héraud & Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Ruben Hoffmann & Louis‐Georges Soler, 2012. "Joint Private Safety Standards and Vertical Relationships in Food Retailing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 179-212, March.
    15. Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul & Roger G. Ginder, 2004. "Cooperative Formation and Financial Contracting in Agricultural Markets," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 03-wp349, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    16. Óscar Gutiérrez & Vicente Salas-Fumás, 2014. "Options in Agency with Binary Uncertainty," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(2), pages 218-236, March.
    17. Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2015. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 833-862, October.
    18. Huashu Wang & Zhenyi Li & H. Holly Wang, 2022. "Does Backward Integration Improve Food Safety of the Tea Industry in China in the Post-COVID-19 Era?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-15, February.
    19. Zhou, Jiehong & Jin, Yu & Liang, Qiao, 2022. "Effects of regulatory policy mixes on traceability adoption in wholesale markets: Food safety inspection and information disclosure," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    20. Hussein, Mohamud & Martinez, Marian Garcia & Fearne, Andrew, 2013. "On The Efficiency of Management-Based Regulation: A Case Study of the UK Poultry Inspection Regime," 87th Annual Conference, April 8-10, 2013, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 158856, Agricultural Economics Society.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anp:en2006:127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rodrigo Zadra Armond (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/anpecea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.