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A Principal-Agent Model For Evaluating The Economic Value Of A Beef Traceability System: A Case Study With Injection-Site Lesions Control In Fed Cattle In The Us

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  • Moisés de Andrade Resende Filho
  • Brian L. Buhr

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Paper provided by ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] in its series Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] with number 127.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:anp:en2006:127

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  1. Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000036, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. David A. Hennessy, 1996. "Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 1034-1043.
  3. Chalfant, James A. & James, Jennifer S. & Lavoie, Nathalie & Sexton, Richard J., 1999. "Asymmetric Grading Error And Adverse Selection: Lemons In The California Prune Industry," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(01), July.
  4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
  5. Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2003. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 248, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  6. S. Andrew Starbird, 2005. "Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(1), pages 15-27.
  7. Peter Bogetoft & Henrik B. Olesen, 2000. "Incentives, Information Systems and Competition," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  8. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1991. "Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem," Working Paper 9118, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Robert P. King & Gé B. C. Backus & Monique A. van der Gaag, 2007. "Incentive systems for food quality control with repeated deliveries: Salmonella control in pork production," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 34(1), pages 81-104, March.
  10. Antle, John M., 2001. "Economic analysis of food safety," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 19, pages 1083-1136 Elsevier.
  11. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
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