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A Principal-Agent Model For Evaluating The Economic Value Of A Beef Traceability System: A Case Study With Injection-Site Lesions Control In Fed Cattle In The Us

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Moisés de Andrade Resende Filho
Brian L. Buhr

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Paper provided by ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] in its series Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] with number 127.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:anp:en2006:127

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  1. Pierre Dubois & Tomislav Vukina, 2004. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 835-841, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hennessy, David A., 2002. "Information Asymmetry as a Reason for Food Industry Vertical Integration," Staff General Research Papers 5032, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Peter Bogetoft & Henrik Ballebye Olesen, 2003. "Incentives, Information Systems, and Competition," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 85(1), pages 234-247, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Robert P. King & Gé B. C. Backus & Monique A. van der Gaag, 2007. "Incentive systems for food quality control with repeated deliveries: Salmonella control in pork production," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 34(1), pages 81-104, March.
  6. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. S. Andrew Starbird, 2005. "Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 87(1), pages 15-27, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Antle, John M., 2001. "Economic analysis of food safety," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 19, pages 1083-1136 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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