In this paper, we aim to investigate the optimum values for the termination rate on mobile networks in Brazil. In order to do so, initially we provide an overview of the legal framework on the subject since the privatization in the beginning of the 90's, as well as a market overview of the telecommunications sector in Brazil. In the second section, we provide a theoretical background on the subject and on the approaches used for the computing these prices, from the Ramsey pricing with network externalities, as used by Ofcom in the setting of termination charges for the United Kingdom, to the ones which use a framework of imperfect competition in the mobile sector, as presented in Wright (2000). The third section carries out a simulation of these approaches for parameter values of the Brazilian case. The fourth section concludes and posits some policy conclusions
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Length: Date of creation: 2005 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:anp:en2005:111
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
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