IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/anp/en2003/d01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mercado de TV Paga no Brasil: Competição Normal Ou Infracionária?

Author

Listed:
  • Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos

    (FURGS)

Abstract

The antitrust authorities have had difficulties to proceed since there are both ambiguity and asymmetric information on firms’ actions. In others words, many controversy appears from the analysis of the reasons and effects of the firms’ specific conduct. This can be seen in the recent DTH Brazilian case conduced by the national antitrust authority (CADE). Some limitations in this case can be highlighted in terms of: the official returns; the related legislation; the specification of the occurred infraction. Beyond, it is missing the strategic interaction aspects of the market. With these questions in mind, the general objective is to organize ideas considering the limitations indicated. The conclusions are: a) the product differentiation promoted by the entrant didn’t reach levels that could justify its condemnation; b) the incumbent had a cooperative behavior followed by a non cooperative one. The possible explanations to that are: a strategic error of the Directv by doesn’t create previous difficulties to the rival entry, maybe because the antitrust authority has credible threat to condemnation; the necessity to look a puppy dog to sustain future agreements with the entrant.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos, 2003. "Mercado de TV Paga no Brasil: Competição Normal Ou Infracionária?," Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31st Brazilian Economics Meeting] d01, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2003:d01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2003/artigos/D01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demsetz, Harold, 1982. "Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 47-57, March.
    2. Ordover, Janusz A. & Saloner, Garth, 1989. "Predation, monopolization, and antitrust," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 537-596, Elsevier.
    3. Roger Ware, 1991. "Entry Deterrence," Working Paper 837, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    4. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    5. Schmalensee, Richard, 1983. "Advertising and Entry Deterrence: An Exploratory Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 636-653, August.
    6. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    7. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    8. Phlips,Louis, 1995. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521498715, October.
    9. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lalit Manral, 2015. "The demand-side dynamics of entrant heterogeneity," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 401-445, April.
    2. Catherine Matraves & Laura Rondi, 2007. "Product Differentiation, Industry Concentration and Market Share Turbulence," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 37-57.
    3. Serge Moresi & Marius Schwartz, 2015. "Strategic Incentives When Supplying to Rivals," Working Papers gueconwpa~15-15-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    4. M. Suresh Babu, 2002. "Economic reforms and entry barriers in Indian manufacturing," Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum Working Papers 331, Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum, India.
    5. Luigi Brighi & Marcello D'Amato, 2018. "Private Information and the Commitment Value of Unobservable Investment," Department of Economics 0123, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    6. Yi Xiang & David Soberman & Hubert Gatignon, 2022. "The Effect of Marketing Breadth and Competitive Spread on Category Growth," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(2), pages 622-644, February.
    7. Luigi Brighi & Marcello D'Amato, 2018. "Private Information and the Commitment Value of Unobservable Investment," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 135, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    8. Bruno, Randolph Luca & Bytchkova, Maria & Estrin, Saul, 2011. "Institutions and Entry: A Cross-Regional Analysis in Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 5504, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    10. Randolph Luca Bruno & Maria Bytchkova & Saul Estrin, 2013. "Institutional Determinants of New Firm Entry in Russia: A Cross-Regional Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1740-1749, December.
    11. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    12. Gert Brunekreeft & David Newbery, 2006. "Should merchant transmission investment be subject to a must-offer provision?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 233-260, November.
    13. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
    14. Zhiyong Liu & Yue Qiao, 2012. "Abuse of Market Dominance Under China’s 2007 Anti-monopoly Law: A Preliminary Assessment," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(1), pages 77-107, August.
    15. Asplund, Marcus, 2002. "Risk-averse firms in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 995-1012, September.
    16. Marcel Canoy & Patrick Rey & Eric van Damme, 2004. "Dominance and Monopolization," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, 2009. "Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 1-18, February.
    18. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
    19. Stephen Martin, 2015. "Areeda–Turner and the Treatment of Exclusionary Pricing under U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(3), pages 229-252, May.
    20. Natália Barbosa, 2003. "What drives new firms into an industry? An integrative model of entry," NIMA Working Papers 23, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anp:en2003:d01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rodrigo Zadra Armond (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/anpecea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.