On the dynamics of interest group formation and endogenous policymaking
AbstractWe present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groups and policymakers, featuring endogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamic patterns in economic policies may arise once interest group formation is taken into account.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance in its series CeNDEF Working Papers with number 00-01.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Dept. of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, NL - 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Phone: + 31 20 525 52 58
Fax: + 31 20 525 52 83
Web page: http://www.fee.uva.nl/cendef/
More information through EDIRC
Interest groups; aspiration level; endogenous fluctuations;
Other versions of this item:
- Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "On the Dynamics of Interest Group Formation and Endogenous Policymaking," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-022/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2001-12-04 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-PUB-2001-12-04 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997.
"Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- van Winden, Frans, 1999. " On the Economic Theory of Interest Groups: Towards a Group Frame of Reference in Political Economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(1-2), pages 1-29, July.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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