WP 8 - Tax vasion in transition: Outcome of an institutional clash? -Testing Feige's conjecture
AbstractA field survey of households was conducted in Tirana, Albania in 2000. A response rate of 89.3% yielded 1.340 valid questionnaires, allowing us to test Feige's (1997) conjecture that more tax evasion will be observed, when formal and informal institutions clash. Respondents' attitudes towards formal and informal institutions were obtained by applying factor analysis to the responses to a series of attitudinal questions. The results of the analysis support Feige's conjecture. An important implication is that when studying tax evasion one should take country specific institutions (and their interaction) into account. JEL codes: H26, O5, O17 Key Words: tax evasion, transition, formal and informal institutions
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by AIAS, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies in its series AIAS Working Papers with number wp8.
Date of creation: Jan 2003
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- O5 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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