WP 37 - Search, mismatch and unemployment
AbstractThis paper explores the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with heterogeneous workers and jobs. In the basic setup the labor force is divided in two groups. The high-skill workers are qualified for all jobs, while low-skill workers can perform unskilled jobs but not the more attractive skilled jobs. We demonstrate that the equilibrium with random search and ex post bargaining is never efficient. Under Hosios’ condition the average wage is correct, but bargaining compresses the wage distribution relative to workers’ shadow values. The wage compression distorts the relative profits of jobs making it too attractive to create skilled jobs. Furthermore, the low skill premium may prevent that the two types of workers efficiently sort in different jobs. In the first case we show that the market offers too few job opportunities for low-skill workers. On the contrary, when mismatch is socially wasteful, we find that low-skill workers experience shorter unemployment spells than in the efficient allocation. Finally, we show that our results generalize to environments with many types of agents and less stringent restrictions on the production technology.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by AIAS, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies in its series AIAS Working Papers with number wp37.
Date of creation: Jan 2005
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