Optimal alcohol taxes for Australia
AbstractObjective: To estimate welfare maximising tax rates for beer, wine, and spirits using a mathematical model that considers both the welfare loss alcohol taxes impose on non-abusive consumers and the welfare gains due to alcohol taxes reducing externality costs. Results: Optimal per litre of pure alcohol (LAL) tax rates are substantially different to both current alcohol tax rates and the uniform tax rate recommended as part of the 2010 Australian Government Tax Review. Given an individual consumer utility decision model, the best estimate values of the welfare maximising LAL tax rates are: $37 for beer, $11 for wine, $50 for spirits, and $77 for ready-to-drink spirits. Conclusion: As externality costs and the responsiveness of consumers to price changes are different for each alcohol type, community welfare is maximised by setting beverage specific LAL tax rates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 108669.
Date of creation: 06 Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Tax; Alcohol; Externalities; Demand and Price Analysis; Health Economics and Policy; I18; H23; H21;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
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- Xueyan Zhao, 2010. "What Do the Bingers Drink? Micro-unit Evidence on Negative Externalities and Drinker Characteristics of Alcohol Consumption by Beverage Types," Wine Economics Research Centre Working Papers 2010-07, University of Adelaide, Wine Economics Research Centre.
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