The Strategic Interdependence of a Shared Water Aquifer: A General Equilibrium Analysis
AbstractIn a region with shared water aquifers, the use of water by one country becomes an externality to another. A policy to subsidize water is shown to lead to both countries being made worse off, but is likely to be supported by special interests having water rights, and those in sectors such as agricultural that uses water relatively intensively. The unilateral water tax will reduce own country's GNP and rise GNP in the other country. Only when both countries impose a tax cooperatively, will GNP rise in both countries.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center in its series Bulletins with number 7512.
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 231ClaOff Building, 1994 Buford Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55108-6040
Phone: (612) 625-1222
Fax: (612) 625-6245
Web page: http://www.apec.umn.edu/EDC.html
More information through EDIRC
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.