In this paper the impact of public policies such as subsidies and taxation on invasive species management is explored in a Markov chain framework. Private agents react to public incentives based upon their long term expected profits and have the option of taking measures such as abatement, monitoring and reporting. Conditions for perverse incentives are derived. The impact of sequencing of taxation and subsides on spread of risks if explored. One key finding of this paper is that excessive regulation may exacerbate the invasive species problem.
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Paper provided by University of Florida, International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center in its series Working Papers with number
15645.
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