The behavior of households has traditionally been explained by assuming that a single decision maker maximizes utility over all members of the household subject to a budget constraint. This unitary model of household behavior has been questioned and compared to models that assume that household decisions are made in a bargaining process. We examine household behavior in a bargaining framework by combining stated preference information from individual members of the household with revealed preference information on the household's actual choices. The context of the decision is determining the location of family recreation vacation choice. The resulting model, based on a bargaining framework, provides information on the factors affecting bargaining power as well as information on the degree to which the decision is the result of a bargaining process.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Rural Economy in its series Staff Paper Series with number
24084.
Length: Date of creation: 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ags:ualbsp:24084
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