Community Governance: An Alternative Approach to Regulation and Market Mechanisms for Management of Nitrogen Loss
AbstractThe National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management now requires that water quality objectives and limits be set for all water bodies in New Zealand. Where objectives result in the development of nitrate limits for waterways and development pressure is likely to make these limits difficult to achieve, systems are needed to avoid over-allocation. This paper proposes a multi-level governance model for managing this load over time, with a focus on community self-governance and building a flexible system for managing leaching risk, given the very high levels of uncertainty in linking nutrient losses to objectives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its series 2012 Conference, August 31, 2012, Nelson, New Zealand with number 136053.
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Diffuse pollution; risk management; market-based instruments; commons resource management; community governance.; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Land Economics/Use; Production Economics;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2012-11-24 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2012-11-24 (Environmental Economics)
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